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Summary 
Humans and animals react in recognizable ways to surprising events. However, there is a lack of 
models that generate surprise intensity and its effects on behaviour in a realistic way, leading to 
impoverished and non-humanlike behaviour of agents in situations where humans would react 
surprised. To fill in this gap in agent-based modelling, a computational model is developed 
based on psychological empirical findings and theories from literature with which agents can 
display surprised behaviour. We tested this model in a simulated  historical case from the 
domain of air combat and evaluated three behavioural properties against these simulated runs. 
The conclusion is that the model captures aspects of surprised behaviour and thus can help make 
agents behave more realistically in surprising situations. 
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1 Introduction 
Surprise is considered an adaptive, evolutionary-based reaction to unexpected events with 
emotional and cognitive aspects (for example Ekman and Friesen ,1975; Plutchik, 1984; 
Scherer, 1984). Experiencing surprise has some effects on human behaviour, for example, 
expression through facial expressions (Ekman and Friesen, 1975) and the interruption of 
ongoing action (Horstman, 2006). However, there is little attention to the phenomenon of 
surprise in agent research and few agents have human-like mechanisms for generating surprise 
intensity and surprised behaviour (one exception for example is Macedo, Cardoso and 
Reisenzein, 2006) . This leads to impoverished and unrealistic behaviour of agents in situations 
where humans would react surprised. 
 
In military training simulations, there is an increasing demand for realistic computer-controlled 
adversaries for a number of reasons, such as cost effectiveness and the ability of having larger 
amounts of actors. One way to make these agents’ behaviour more realistically is to augment 
then with realistic models that generate surprise and its influences their behaviour. 
 
The phenomenon of surprise has a more specific relevance in the military domain, besides its 
general importance as a basic human emotion. Indeed, the element of surprise is considered an 
important factor in military operations by many military experts. Strategists such as Sun Tzu, 
F.C. Fuller and John Boyd have stressed the advantages of surprising the enemy (see e.g. 
Niederhauser 1994).  
 
From the previous paragraphs we can conclude that having realistic surprise models that are 
useable in simulation agents is desirable. Therefore we propose in this paper a computational 
model that can be used in agents operating in training simulation that makes their behaviour 
more humanlike in surprising situations. The model is based on psychological empirical studies 
and is verified in a simulated scenario from the domain of military aviation against a number of 
properties. 
 
We will first give an overview on the existing literature on surprise and its effect on behaviour. 
After that, we show and explain the computational model we have developed.  
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2 Theory 
One of the more influential models that explain the mechanisms behind how surprise intensity is 
generated in human is the expectancy-disconfirmation model (Stiensmeier-Pelster et al, 1995). 
According to the expectancy-disconfirmation theory, the main contributing factor to surprise is 
expectancy disconfirmation. In this view, people create expectations on how events in the world 
unfold. If they subsequently encounter an event that does not fall within their expectations, they 
will be surprised. This surprise triggers what is called an attribution process, a form of causal 
reasoning which leads to an attribution of the situation to certain causes in order to make sense 
of the situation. The duration of this causal attribution process depends not only on the surprise 
intensity but also on other factors such as importance of the surprising event and whether the 
event is seen as positive or negative (valence). A number of experiments in (Stiensmeier-Pelster 
et al 1995) show that expectancy disconfirmation is indeed an important factor for surprise. 
 
Several criticisms have been raised on the expectancy-disconfirmation model. They mainly 
contest the claim that expectancy-disconfirmation is the only factor that determines surprise 
intensity. 
 
The experimental results shown in (Gendolla and Keller, 2001) shows in a number of 
experiments that unexpected events that are seen as more important by a subject are experienced 
as more surprising. Also, failures are seen as more surprising than successes, establishing a 
correlation between the valence of an event and the intensity of surprise the event evokes. 
Further studies confirm these findings. 
 
Other research (Maguire and Keane, 2006) shows that an unexpected event is seen as less 
surprising if the surprised person is offered a reasonable explanation that more or less justifies 
the occurence of the surprising event. This is explained by the authors as several experiments 
(Teigen, Keren 2002) show that amongst other factors, events that are familiar are less 
surprising. In the experinments, participants are more surprised if result contrast with earlier 
experiences. In other words, the event was more novel to the surprised person.  
In conclusion, we have the following factors that influence the intensity of surprise: 
1) expectation disconfirmation,  
2) importance of observed event,  
3) whether the observed event is seen as positive or negative (valence),  
4) difficulty of explaining / fitting it in schema and  
5) novelty (contrast with earlier experiences). 
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Besides the intensity of surprise, The effects of surprise on behaviour are explored in 
psychological research. Resulting from this research is that one of the main effects of surprise 
that is interesting for agents in training simulations is that it interrupt current activity and slows 
down the response to the surprising events because of the attribution process (Horstman,2006, 
Stiensmeier-Pelster et al, 1995). A consequent of this is that less time remains for actual 
decision making. As some studies have shown, decision making quality suffers under time 
pressure (Isenberg,1984; Mann and Tan, 1993). Especially in military tactical situations, 
decisions are made under considerale time pressure. It is reasonable to assume that a surprise 
indirectly leads to less quality in responding behaviour in time-critical situations such as 
military tactical situations.  
So we have two possible effects of surprise on behaviour that could be incorporated in agents: 
1) response delay and importance of observed event,  
2) reduced response quality. 
 
 
3 Model 
The model has been defined as a set of temporal relations between properties of states. A state 
property is a conjunction of atoms or negations of atoms that hold or do not hold at a certain 
time. The exact choice for what atoms to use depends on the actual model and domain and is 
defined by an ontology for that model. To model dynamics, transitions between states are 
defined.  
 
In order to obtain an executable formal model, the states and temporal relations between them 
have been specified in LEADSTO (Bosse, Jonker, van der Meij and Treur, 2007), a temporal 
language in which the dynamic relations can be defined in the form of temporal rules that can be 
executed. Let andbe state properties, in LEADSTO the notation  e,f,g,h means 
if state property holds for a certain time interval with duration g, then after some delay 
(between e and f) state property will hold for a certain time interval h. 
As all of the temporal relations used in the model are of the form 0,0,1,1 ,  the simplified 
notation   will be used instead. Intuitively, the symbol  can be read as an if-then rule, 
where the consequent holds at the next moment in time. 
 
3.1 Model overview 
The surprise model can be divided into four parts: event evaluation, surprise generation, the 
sensemaking process and the effects of sensemaking on behaviour. In figure 1 an overview of 
the causal relations between the various states of the model is shown. 
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In the model, events in the environment are continuously monitored and evaluated. This 
evaluation consists of determining the degree of expectation disconfirmation, the perceived 
importance of  the event and the novelty of the event. This evaluation is then used to generate 
the surprise intensity. As the evaluation happens continually, this means that there is a surprise 
intensity value at any moment. 
 
Based on the surprise intensity, the sensemaking process can be initiated, continued or halted. 
The sensemaking process is roughly analogous to the causal attribution process in the 
expectation-disconfirmation theory (Stiensmeier-Pelster 1995). Its purpose is to revise the 
agent’s beliefs on the current situation that have been invalidated by the surprising event. The 
sensemaking process has a feedback influence on surprise intensity, lowering it over time. This 
feedback represents the idea that the functional role of surprise is to regulate the sensemaking 
process. As sensemaking proceeds, the need for sensemaking decreases and likewise surprise 
intensity. 
 
The last part of the model deals with the effects of sensemaking on behaviour, represented by 
plans. The type and quality of the behaviour is determined by the beliefs the agent has and the 
time pressure, which rises with a longer sensemaking duration. 
 
3.2 Event evaluation 
The three outcomes of the event evaluation in our model are 1) expectation disconfirmation, 2) 
event importance and 3) event novelty. The model does not include the event valence 
evaluation, as it not entirely clear from the literature what the exact impact of event valence on 
surprise intensity is. The three outcomes are represented by a real value between 0 and 1. We 
observed 
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have not formalised the process that generate the evaluation outcomes as the focus of this paper 
is on generating surprise intensity and resulting behaviour. In this section we give some 
guidelines and ideas on how to interpret and generate these values 
 
Outcome 1: expectation disconfirmation 
The function of expectation disconfirmation in the model is to measure the degree of 
discrepancy between the expectations of the agent and the actual observed events. The higher 
this value, the more unexpected the event is to the agent. 
 
Outcome 2: event importance 
Event importance measures the perceived impact the event has on the agent. A higher 
importance indicates that the event has relative farreaching consequences for the agent. 
Calculating the event importance can be done on basis of the goals, plans and desires the agent 
has, as well as other subjective aspects. 
 
Outcome 3: event novelty 
Event novelty gives an indication of how familiar an event is, how often the agent has 
experienced this situation before. A mechanism that links the agent’s episodic memory on 
similar previous experiences with the observed event is needed for generating the value for 
event novelty. 
 
It must be stressed that these three outcomes are relative and depend on the agent’s internal 
state. Event importance and event novelty are thus more accurately described as the event 
importance and novelty as perceived by the agent with the surprise model. For example, it is 
entirely possible that one event is seen as important to one agent and at the same time 
unimportant to another. 
 
3.3 Surprise generation 
Surprise intensity is represented as a real value between 0 and 1. In the model, the surprise 
intensity is not direcly calculated. Instead, the rate of change or derivative is calculated and this 
rate of change is then added to the current surprise intensity value. This rate of change is called 
the delta surprise intensity in the model.  
 
The calculation of surprise intensity can then be informally described as follows: 
 
If currently the surprise intensity has value si and the delta surprise intensity has value 
dsi, in the next moment the surprise intensity will have the value si + dsi. 
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More formally,  
 
surprise_intensity(si) & delta_si(dsi)  surprise_intensity(si + dsi) 
 
The influences that determine surprise intensity that we identified in the previous section are 
used in the calculation of delta surprise intensity. The expectation disconfirmation, event 
importance and event novelty are the factors that increase surprise intensity. Two factors 
decrease surprise intensity, sensemaking feedback and decay. The idea behind the sensemaking 
process reducing surprise intensity is that the process in the model represents a cognitive effort 
to reduce surprise by explaining the event and fitting it in an revised view of the situation. The 
sensemaking feedback value represents the degree of succes of explaining the surprising event. 
In contrast to this, the decay factor represents the non-cognitive factors that reduce the intensity 
of emotions like surprise over time. 
 
Informally, the calculation of the delta surprise intensity occurs as follows: 
 
If currently the surprise intensity has value si, there is an expectation disconfirmation 
with value ed, the importance and novelty of the currently observed events have 
respectively the values i and n, the weights for importance and novelty have values wi 
and wn and the decay parameter has value d and the sensemaking feedback has value sf, 
the delta surprise intensity for the next time step is determined by the formula  
 
dsi =  (1 - si) · ed · (wi · i + wn · n) - (si · (d + sf))   (1) 
 
More formally, in LEADSTO format: 
 
surprise_intensity(si) & expectation_disconfirmation(ed) & weight_importance(wi) & 
importance(i) & weight_novelty(wn) & novelty(n) & sensemaking_feedback(sf) & 
decay(d)  
 delta_si( (1 - si) · ed · (wi·i + wn·n) - (si · (d + sf)) ) 
 
As formula (1) is an important part of the model, we will examine it in more detail. Formula (1) 
consists of the addition of two formulas, (2) and (3). 
 
 (1 - si) · ed · (wi · i + wn · n)       (2) 
 - (si · (de + sf))         (3) 
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Formula (2) is about the factors that increase surprise intensity while formula (3) represents the 
decreasing factors. Formula (3) is negated so that sensemaking and decay can be represented by 
positive values. 
 
In formula (2), the expectation disconfirmation is multiplied with the sum of the importance and 
novelty factors that are themselves multiplied with their weight values. The reason for this 
construction consists of two assumptions. First, the assumption that without expectation 
disconformation, there is no surprise. Second, the assumption that importance and novelty have 
a different effect in that they alone do not lead to surprise. For example, observing an important 
event that has been expected should not lead to surprise. These two assumptions are captured 
with formula (2). The weights wi and wn add up to 1, so that the outcome of ed · (wi · i + wn · 
n) alway lies between 0 and 1. With these weights, the relative influence between the two 
factors can be tuned.  
 
We multiply ed · (wi · i + wn · n) with (1-si) in order to keep the value of surprise intensity 
below 1. As this value increases, the value of (1-si) decreases, reducing formula (2) and thus 
reducing the increase of formula (1). Including (1-si) ensures that the surprise intensity value 
changes smoothly over time. 
 
In formula (3), the value obtained from the sensemaking process feedback and the decrease 
parameter are simply added. We multiply this addition with si for a similar reason as with the 
inclusion of the term (1-si)  in formula (2): to keep the value of surprise intensity positive. 
 
3.4 The sensemaking process 
The process of sensemaking is abstracted in our model. It is represented by two dynamic 
properties, the need for sensemaking and the sensemaking feedback. The first property, the need 
for sensemaking, is represented by a boolean variable that is used to control the sensemaking 
process. If its value is true, the process is active and if false the process is inactive. The 
sensemaking process has two direct effects: first, it lowers surprise intensity by means of the 
sensemaking feedback and second, it causes beliefs the agent has on the situation to be revised. 
 
Two parameters, the sensemaking start threshold and end threshold, deterimene when the need 
for sensemaking becomes true. The sensemaking process start as the surprise intensity rises 
above the start threshold, which causes the surprise intensity to drop. The sensemaking process 
continues until the surprise intensity falls below the end threshold. This mechanism represents 
the idea that the computationally costly process of sensemaking only takes place if a 
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considerable surprise takes place and that this process endures until the feedback from 
sensemaking has reduced the surprise sufficiently.  
 
Formally, the rules for determining the need for sensemaking are as follows:  
 
surprise_intensity(si) & sensemaking_start_threshold(start_thr) & start_thr <= si  
 need_for_sensemaking(true) 
 
surprise_intensity(si) & sensemaking_end_threshold(end_thr) & si <= end_thr 
 need_for_sensemaking(false) 
 
need_for_sensemaking(currentValue) & surprise_intensity(si) & 
sensemaking_start_threshold(start_thr) &  
sensemaking_end_threshold(end_thr) & end_thr < si & si < start_thr 
 need_for_sensemaking(currentValue) 
 
The second property, the sensemaking feedback, can only have two values: zero if the need for 
sensemaking is false and a value equal to the sensemaking ability parameter if the need for 
sensemaking is true. As we have no empirical support on the precise dynamics of surprise 
intensity, we have kept the mechanism for sensemaking feedback as simple as possible. In this 
mechanism, the sensemaking ability is a parameter than indicates how well sensemaking 
progresses. With this parameter it is possible to differentiate between skilled, experienced pilots 
and less experienced pilots.  
 
3.5 The effects of the sensemaking process 
As explained in section 2, the occurrence of sensemaking has two effects on behaviour: delay in 
response and decline in response quality. The delay in reponse is implictly modelled in the 
model because the sensemaking process takes a number of time steps to complete. Only after 
the sensemaking process finishes can a response to the event be made. Time pressure is 
calculated by dividing the duration of sensemaking by the maximal possible duration, resulting 
in a value between 0 and 1. A higher time pressure results in a lower quality plan. 
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4 Case Study 
In order to test the model, we constructed a case study loosely based on a historical event in air 
combat, Operation Bolo (Isby, 1997; Michel, 1997). Operation Bolo was a US Air Force 
(USAF) offensive operation during the Vietnam War against the North Vietnamese Air Force 
(NVAF). It is considered to be one of the most successful surprise attacks in air combat history.  
The NVAF continually attacked the USAF bomber1 missions in hit-and-run strikes, disengaging 
before the Americans could mount a counterattack. In response to this, colonel Robert Olds, an 
experienced fighter pilot in the USAF, planned a trap. A number of fighters carrying detectable 
bomber equipment with them would fly in a bomber-like formation flew along the standard 
route the bombers took and would carry anti-air missiles instead of bombs with them. Using 
these ruses, the USAF hoped that they could lure the NVAF fighters into open combat. The plan 
did indeed work. On January 2, 1967, 28 USAF fighters engaged 16 NVAF fighters, destroying 
7 Vietnamese airplanes with no losses on the American side (Isby, 1997). 
 
Although detailed information on the mission is hard to find, there is evidence that confirms that 
the Vietnamese pilots behaved surprised and that this had effects on the situation. One of the 
USAF pilots has stated that the NVAF pilots appeared to be confused2. Also, a military report 
on the operation states that “...however, the NVN air Force apparantly did not expect a strike 
and their reaction to Operation Bolo was much slower than anticipated” (Futrell, 1976). This is 
in accordance with the psychological research indicating that surprise leads to a slower 
response. 
 
Based on this event, we constructed a case against which we tested our model. In this case, the 
agent plays the role of a NVAF fighter pilot. It expects to intercept an enemy bomber formation 
with no air-to-air missiles. Instead, it will encounter fighters well equipped for air combat. What 
our model should show is that an agent using the model will react in a worse way to this 
unexpected situation compared to a expected situation. 
                                                     
1 Technically, most of the bombing runs were done with the F-105 Thunderchief, a fighter-bomber which was also capable 
of air-to-air combat. However, its air-to-air combat performance was inferior to the Mig-21, against which Bolo was aimed. 
The F-4 Phantom, the fighter that was used for Bolo, was more or less comparable in air-to-air combat to the Mig-21. 
2 In the History Channel documentary “Dogfights”, season 1, episode 2 (“Air Ambush”, 11/10/2006), Robin Olds says that  
“They [the NVAF pilots] realized that we were not Thuds [nickname for F-105]...Mass confusion”.  
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5 Simulation 
The model described in the previous sections has been used to run a number of simulations, 
using the LEADSTO software environment as described in (Bosse et al, 2007). Within this 
software environment simulation traces (i.e., sequences of states) can be visualised. An example 
of such a simulation trace can be seen in Figure 2. Here, time is on the horizontal axis, the state 
properties are on the vertical axis. A dark box on top of the line indicates that the property is 
true during that time period, and a lighter box below the line indicates that the property is false. 
 
An environment and scenario for the agent has been implemented based on the case described 
earlier. We programmed a simple mechanism for expectation generation in the agent. It is given 
a list of events that should occur after each other, representing a script or prototypical chain of 
events. As we based the case on Operation Bolo, this script mimics the historical events. The 
script is take_off, reach_interception_point, detect_aircraft and aircraft_recognition_bomber. The agent generate 
an expectation based on the first element in this list and generates an expectation based on the 
next element every time it observes an event. 
 
The behaviour of the agent is represented by a plan. There are are three possible plans in this 
scenario: offensive_tactics_high_quality, offensive_tactics_medium_quality and offensive_tactics_low_quality. 
These represents the same offensive tactics that the Vietnamese displayed in the historical case, 
with different levels of quality3 so that the effect of surprise can be shown. In this simulation, 
the importance and novelty of events are parameters, as is sensemaking ability.  
 
The sensemaking ability and novelty parameters present the opportunity to represent different 
levels of experience and skill in our model. This ability to differentiate agents is desireable, as it 
makes agents appear more realistic (they have different “personalities”) and enables scenario 
designers with agents of different challenge level. An experienced agent would have a low 
novelty value for most events, reducing the initial rise in surprise intensity and lowering the 
decline in response time and quality. Also, an experienced agent would have a higher 
sensemaking ability, indicating a higher skill level in situational awareness.  
 
To give an impression of how the model behaves, figure 2 shows the trace of a simulation in 
which an inexperienced agent (high novelty, low sensemaking ability) encounters a surprising 
event: fighters instead of bombers. At the moment the agent sees that the enemy aircraft is a 
fighter, the expectation disconfirmation becomes 1 and coupled with a high importance and 
                                                     
3 Quality of response in this context is a measure of the lethality, survivability and resource controll of the behaviour. These 
three measurements are a standard way of evaluation military effectiveness of tactics and such. 
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novelty values of 1.0, the surprise intensity rises. Coupled with a low sensemaking ability, the 
duration of the sensemaking is quite high (21 time steps out of a maximum of 30), so time 
pressure is quite high, lowering the quality of the response plan. 
 
 
Figure 2: Partial trace of the model reacting to a surprising event  
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6 Evaluation 
Three hypotheses concerning behavioural properties have been identified to evaluate the 
validity of the proposed model. In order to test whether the model satisfies these properties, 
eight differently configured simulations of the model have been run, the results of which can be 
seen in table 1.  
 
The first hypothese is that if an agent observes an event which it did not expect, it will react 
slower and with a response of lower or equal quality than if the event was expected. As table 1 
shows, trace 1 and 3 have identically configured agents. With surprise, there is a considerable 
delay and lower quality in response. Likewise with traces 2 and 5, a delay occurs with surprise. 
 
The second hypothese is that an agent representing a more experienced pilot will react faster 
and with a higher quality response to the same unexpected event than an agent representing a 
less experienced pilot. Traces 3, 4 and 5 illustrate this. Duration and quality level decrease with 
higher sensemaking ability and lower novelty. 
 
The third hypothese is that unimportant unexpected events do not result in a sensemaking 
process (and thus are effectively ignored by the agent). This holds for the medium experienced 
(trace 7) and very experienced configurations (trace 8), but not for the inexperienced 
configuration (trace 6). Further testing showed that no sensemaking takes place if the event 
novelty in trace 6 was lower than 0.9.  
 
In summary, the first two hypotheses are confirmed, while the third is confirmed in most cases, 
except the situations representing an inexperienced agent. 
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Table 1: Simulation results. Expectation disconfirmation, event importance and event novelty 
refer to the aircraft_recognition events. 
 
 
7 Summary, relevant work and conclusion 
This paper introduces a computational model for surprise generation and its effect on behaviour. 
A number of psychological theories and empirical studies found in the literature have been 
integrated into a single model. Verification shows that the model does indeed generate different 
behaviour in surprising events and with different representations of experience and importance 
evaluations. 
 
There have been some research on computational models of surprise for use in agents. A notable 
example is S-EUNE (Macedo Cardoso and Reisenzein, 2006), an agent architecture which uses 
surprise intensity to enable agents to explore unknown environments. S-EUNE differs from the 
model in this paper in many ways, most importantly in the mechanism of surprise generation (in 
                                                     
4 The quality of response is the quality of the agent’s plan at the end of the trace. 
trace configuration description 
sense-
making 
ability 
expecta
tion 
discon-
firmatio
n 
event 
importa
nce 
event 
novelty 
duration 
of 
sense-
making 
quality of 
response
4 
1 no surprise, 
inexperienced agent 
0.1 0.0 1.0 1.0 0 high 
2 no surprise, 
very experienced agent 
0.3 0.0 1.0 0.1 0 high 
3 important surprise, 
inexperienced agent 
0.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 21 low 
4 important surprise,  
medium exp. agent 
0.2 1.0 1.0 0.5 10 medium 
5 important surprise, 
very experienced agent 
0.3 1.0 1.0 0.1 6 high 
6 unimportant surprise, 
inexperienced agent 
0.1 1.0 0.1 1.0 16 medium 
7 unimportant surprise, 
medium exp. agent 
0.2 1.0 0.1 0.5 0 high 
8 unimportant surprise, 
very experienced agent 
0.3 1.0 0.1 0.1 0 high 
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S-EUNE only expectation disconfirmation is used for calculating surprise intensity) and the lack 
of a sensemaking process.  
 
The model presented in this paper can be used as part of an agent in simulated environments so 
that its behaviour is enriched with differentiated behaviour in case of surprising events. 
Additionally, the model incorporates the effects of experience and differences in personal 
capabilities in sensemaking, so that the generated surprised behaviour is further differentiated. 
While the model is relatively simple and there is room for improvement in for example the 
representation of the sensemaking process, it adresses the current lack of realistic models of 
surprise and its effect on behaviour in agent research. 
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